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Outline
• Introduction: Finland, CAP, subsidies, heterogeneity 
• Data and methods: survey, stated preferences, latent class
• Results: latent farmer classes behind insurance demand
• Conclusions: policy challenge for CAP
2 16.6.2015
© Natural Resources Institute Finland
Finland, CAP
• In the EU member states the crop damages are mainly compensated 
by ad hoc basis. 
• The compensation payment for crop damage amounts to an average 
of about €920 million per year.
• Individual member state specific programs. In Finland CDC scheme.
• In Finland we have a lacking culture on yield insurances, conformed 
with serious knowledge caps in development and administration of 
such insurances.
• The markets for crop insurance are developing in the EU. Premium 
subsidies could be as large as 65 %. 
• For subsidies there are EU wide rules, following strictly WTO green 
box regulations.
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Heterogeneity
• Decoupled income support is preferred in the EU Common 
Agricultural Policy CAP. Policies support all farms in the same way 
despite farmers’ risk preferences → deductible and scale are typically 
fixed. 
• The purpose of this study was to investigate the demand for crop 
insurance in Finland. Willingness to pay is interesting, but…
• … we were more interested in seeing, whether the farmers are 
heterogeneous according the weights they give for insurance 
attributes (price, deductible, scale and insurance type).
• Moreover, the farmers were grouped according to the weights they 
assigned to crop insurance attributes. 
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Data
• No existing markets → no data → hypothetical markets
• The choice experiment survey was conducted. 
• The survey was sent to a total of 5,000 farmers in Finland. 
• Respondents were shown six crop insurance product cards. 
Each choice card presented two different crop insurance 
products with varying attributes. 
• The farmers were asked to select the most suitable crop 
insurance product for them (including “no buy”). 
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Choice card
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INSURANCE CARD 1 Insurance 1 Insurance 2 No buy 
levels
Insurance 
premium 
€/hectare 
12 16 
I would not 
purchase 
insurance 
€4–32/ha
Deductible 20% 20% 10%, 20%, and 30% 
Insurance type 
Yield index 
insurance, farm 
inspection is 
not needed. 
Farm yield 
insurance, 
inspection of 
loss at the farm 
is needed. 
yield index, 
farm yield 
Expected 
compensation 
€/hectare 
300 600 
€100/ha 
€300/ha ($135/acre)
€600/ha 
MY CHOICE □ □ □
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… methods
• Stated preferences, choice experiment
• Latent class model, maximum likelihood + iterations based on number of classes   
• The farmer classes were determined purely based on the choices 
made by the individuals in the choice experiment. The individual farm / 
farmer characteristics were set to be inactive, and they did not consequently affect the 
latent class model (number of classes)
• Choice models measured utility, thus coefficients are not 
interpretable in economic terms, despite their signs. 
• Class specific implicit prices for attributes are calculated as,  
where βk is the parameter of kth attribute, and βp is the parameter of 
price coefficient.
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Results
• A model with three farmer classes was selected based on BIC statistics and reasonable 
class sizes. 
• Insurance type turned out to be insignificant in farmers’ choices.
• The Wald p-values indicate that rest of the attributes were jointly significant.
• Wald* p-values show that only the price attributes were class dependent. However, this is very important 
for economic interpretation of the results. 
8 16.6.2015
Model for Choices 
     
 
Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Overall 
 R² 0.3393 0.2091 0.2903 0.5395 
 R²(0) 0.4213 0.9389 0.4058 0.5774 
 size  0.42 0.3 0.28 
  Attributes Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Wald p-value Wald* p-value 
Reference level 0 0 0 0 0 
1 -1.2442 -7.464 0.0023 0.0024 0.0062 
2 -1.1769 -12.0135 0.0487 
  3 2.4211 19.4775 -0.051 
  Price -0.1219 -0.5788 -0.0752 <0.001 0.029 
Deductible -2.9507 -29.1756 -2.7591 <0.001 0.39 
Scale 0.0054 0.0081 0.0044 <0.001 0.3 
The reference level for all attributes is set to 0. Constant 3 refers to the “no buy” option. 
All estimated parameters are significant at the 99% level based on z-statistics. 
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Interpretaation
• Implicit prices (IP) are the marginal rates of substitution between price and product 
attributes. 
• Implicit prices provide some guidelines for the labeling of latent farmer groups revealed 
by the estimation.
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IP (€/ha) Class1 Class2 Class3
Deductible (+10%) -2.4 -5.0 -3.7
Scale (+ €100/ha) 4.4 1.4 5.9
WTP*) 6.03 -10.92 6.55
*) Deductible 30 % and scale €300/ha
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Interpretation
non-insurers,30%
• Negative WTP
• They have the 
lowest IP for the 
scale.
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Yield risk managers, 42%
• Lower (negative) IP for 
deductible
• Farmers look for insurance 
products that are more of the 
catastrophe prevention type.
Insurers , 28%
• High and negative IP for 
the deductible
• Prefer shallow loss type 
insurances
IP (€/ha) Class1 Class2 Class3
Deductible (+10%) -2.4 -5.0 -3.7
Scale (+ €100/ha) 4.4 1.4 5.9
WTP*) 6.03 -10.92 6.55
*) Deductible 30% and scale €300/ha
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Interpretation
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Since adverse
selection has been a
prominent problem in
yield insurances, we
described latent farm
groups according to 
farm characteristics.
% 
 
 
Yield risk 
 managers 
 
42% 
 
Non-insurers 
 
 
30% 
 
 Insurers 
 
 
28% 
 
Production line 
 
Animal husbandry 42 26 32 
 
Crop farming 
 
45 26 29 
 
Farm size (ha) 10–19.99 29 41 29 
 
  20–29.99  37 43 20 
 
 30–49.99  54 20 26 
 
 50–99.99  41 20 39 
 
 ≥100 54 15 31 
 
Region West 51 22 27 
 
 East 31 29 40 
 
 North 14 29 57 
 
 South 41 30 30 
 
West: Pohjanmaa, Satakunta 
East: Kaakkois-Suomi, Kainuu, Savo, Karjala  
North: Kainuu, Lappi 
South: Uusimaa, Varsinaissuomi  
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Conclusions
• Used dataset reveals heterogeneity among farmers regarding 
insurance attributes → one size does not fit all.
• No clear linear connection between latent groups and farm 
characteristics was found.
• Uniform catastrophic assistance rules  for  whole Finland 
would be challenging to implement because of the regional 
heterogeneity in farmers preferences.    
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Thank you!
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